Resumen
In this paper an attack strategy on the Data Encryption Standard (DES) that is different from the existing ones is developed. The attack strategy is based on a theorem proved by the author, called LR theorem. The attack can be done by means of a personal computer, i.e. a Pentium IV based machine. Obviously, more information than a sample of plaintext and ciphertext is required. However, this additional requirement is reduced to a minimum of just 24 bits. The LR theorem uncovers 16 trapdoors of which 2 are of importance. With this knowledge, an attack on Triple-DES can be performed using the aforementioned personal computer. A simple solution to this kind of attack is proposed, preserving the complexity of the Triple-DBS, 2112.
Idioma original | Inglés |
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Número de artículo | 591504 |
Páginas (desde-hasta) | 1-7 |
Número de páginas | 7 |
Publicación | Proceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering |
Volumen | 5915 |
DOI | |
Estado | Publicada - 2005 |
Evento | Mathematics of Data/Image Coding, Compression, and Encryption VIII, with Applications - San Diego, CA, Estados Unidos Duración: 1 ago. 2005 → 3 ago. 2005 |