TY - GEN
T1 - Analysis of best-reply strategies in repeated finite Markov Chains Games
AU - Clempner, Julio
AU - Poznyak, Alexander
PY - 2013
Y1 - 2013
N2 - The "best-reply strategy" is a natural and most commonly applied type of actions which players prefer to use during a repeated game. Usually, the behavior of an individual cost-function, when such strategies are applied, turns out to be non-monotonic, and, as the results, to make the conclusion that such strategies lead to some equilibrium point is a non-trivial and delicate task. Moreover, even in repeated games the convergence to a stationary equilibrium is not always guaranteed. Here we show that in the ergodic class of finite controllable Markov Chains Dynamic Games the best reply actions lead obligatory to one of Nash equilibrium points. This conclusion is done by the Lyapunov Games concept which is based on the designing of an individual Lyapunov function (related with an individual cost function) which monotonically decreases (non-increases) during the game. The suggested approach is illustrated by the repeated asynchronous "Prisoner's Dilemma" game with bestreply actions application.
AB - The "best-reply strategy" is a natural and most commonly applied type of actions which players prefer to use during a repeated game. Usually, the behavior of an individual cost-function, when such strategies are applied, turns out to be non-monotonic, and, as the results, to make the conclusion that such strategies lead to some equilibrium point is a non-trivial and delicate task. Moreover, even in repeated games the convergence to a stationary equilibrium is not always guaranteed. Here we show that in the ergodic class of finite controllable Markov Chains Dynamic Games the best reply actions lead obligatory to one of Nash equilibrium points. This conclusion is done by the Lyapunov Games concept which is based on the designing of an individual Lyapunov function (related with an individual cost function) which monotonically decreases (non-increases) during the game. The suggested approach is illustrated by the repeated asynchronous "Prisoner's Dilemma" game with bestreply actions application.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84902356207&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/CDC.2013.6759942
DO - 10.1109/CDC.2013.6759942
M3 - Contribución a la conferencia
AN - SCOPUS:84902356207
SN - 9781467357173
T3 - Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
SP - 568
EP - 573
BT - 2013 IEEE 52nd Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2013
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 52nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2013
Y2 - 10 December 2013 through 13 December 2013
ER -