An optimal strong equilibrium solution for cooperative multi-leader-follower Stackelberg Markov chains games

K. K. Trejo, J. B. Clempner, A. S. Poznyak

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

26 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper presents a novel approach for computing the strong Stackelberg/Nash equilib-rium for Markov chains games. For solving the cooperative n-leaders and m-followers Markov game we consider the minimization of the Lp-norm that reduces the distance to the utopian point in the Euclidian space. Then, we reduce the optimization problem to find a Pareto optimal solution. We employ a bi-level programming method implemented by the extraproximal optimization approach for computing the strong Lp-Stackelberg/Nash equilibrium. We validate the proposed method theoretically and by a numerical experiment related to marketing strategies for supermarkets.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)258-279
Number of pages22
JournalKybernetika
Volume52
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 2016

Keywords

  • L-norm
  • Markov chains
  • Stackelberg and Nash
  • Strong equilibrium

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