Using the extraproximal method for computing the shortest-path mixed Lyapunov equilibrium in Stackelberg security games

Julio B. Clempner, Alexander S. Poznyak

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

15 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper we present a game theory model based on the extraproximal approach for computing the shortest-path Lyapunov equilibrium in Stackelberg security games. The extraproximal method is employed to compute the mixed stationary strategies: attackers operate on partial knowledge of the defender's strategies for fixed targets. We transform the Stackelberg game into a potential (Lyapunov) game replacing the ergodic behavior of the system by a shortest-path trajectory implemented by a Lyapunov-like function. In the resulting potential security game the Stackelberg and Nash equilibria coincide with the Lyapunov equilibrium. Validity of the proposed method is demonstrated both theoretically and experimentally.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)14-30
Number of pages17
JournalMathematics and Computers in Simulation
Volume138
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Aug 2017

Keywords

  • Extraproximal method
  • Finite Markov chains
  • Lyapunov games
  • Security games
  • Strong Stackelberg equilibrium

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